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Abstract
Many studies have shown that people display an apparent overcondence. In par-
ticular, it is common for a majority of people to describe themselves as better-than-
average. The literature takes for granted that this better-than-average is problematic.
We argue, however, that, even accepting these studies on their own terms, there is
nothing at all wrong with a strict majority of people rating themselves above the
median.
When it comes to overcondence, there is a consensus on a consensus: writers agree that
researchers have found overcondence to be common. Typical comments include Dozens of
studies show that people...are generally overcondent about their skills (Camerer, 1997),
Perhaps the most robust nding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overcon-
dent(DeBondt and Thaler, 1995), and The tendency to evaluate oneself more favorably
than others is a staple nding in social psychology(Alicke et al. 1995). While the study
of overcondence originated in the psychology literature, the phenomenon has migrated into
the economics and nance literature, taking its place in the growing list of irrationalas-
pects of human attitudes and behaviour that have moved from the fringes to the forefront
of mainstream thinking.1
If people are indeed overcondent there are important implications for our understanding
of the economy, and for public policy. For instance, a basic principle of competition is that
rms will enter an industry only up to the point that they earn zero expected prots. But
if, to take one industry, restaurateurs overestimate their abilities, we can expect too many
restaurants to open only to close shortly thereafter, and the restaurant business to lose
We thank Stefano Sacchetto for his research assistance.
1Papers on overcondence in economics include Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Garcia, Sangiorgi and Uro-
sevic (2007), Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Koszegi (2006), Menkho¤ et al. (2006), Noth and Weber (2003),
Van den Steen (2004), Zabojnik (2004). In nance, recent (published) papers include Barber and Odean
(2001), Biais et al. (2005), Bernardo and Welch (2001), Chuang and Lee (2006), Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Wang
(2001).
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money on average. At the same time, if people overestimate their driving ability, then
merely informing them of general risks will not induce them to take su¢ cient care.
Overcondence has been reported in peoplesbeliefs in the precision of their estimates,
in their beliefs about the likelihood their answers to questions are correct, and in their
appraisal of their relative skills and virtues. In this paper, we are concerned with the last
form of overcondence.2 As Myers (1999; p:57) writes, on nearly any dimension that is
both subjective and socially desirable, most will see themselves as better than average.As
evidence, he cites research showing that most people perceive themselves as more intelligent
than their average peer, most business managers rate their performance as better than
their average peers, and most high school students rate themselves as more original than
the average high-schooler. In an oft-quoted study, Svenson found that 77% of Swedish
subjects felt they were safer drivers than the median, and 69% felt they were more skillful.
These ndings, and others like them, are typically cited as evidence of overcondence, at
least in peoplesestimation of their relative skills, without any explanation as to why such
data is indicative of mistaken self-appraisals. For instance, Alicke et al. (1995)) simply
assert that the better-than-average e¤ect provides compelling evidence that people maintain
unrealistically positive images of themselves relative to others[italics added]. Presumably,
the reason for this lack of explanation is that, since it is logically impossible for most people
to be better than average(Taylor and Brown (1988)), it seems obvious that some people
must be making errors in their self-evaluations. But the simple truism that most people
cannot be better than average more precisely, the median does not imply that most
people cannot rationally rate themselves above average. Indeed, we will show that none of
the evidence cited above is evidence of unrealistically positive images at all. This is true
even if we accept the evidence described on its own terms (and do not, for example, argue
that subjects misunderstood the questions, or disagreed in their interpretations). Failure to
recognize this fact comes from a failure to frame the issue of overcondence precisely.
To illustrate the main point of this paper, consider a large population with three types
of drivers, low skilled, medium skilled, and high skilled, and suppose that the probabilities
of any one of them causing an accident in any single period are pL = 45 ; pM =
2
5
; and pH = 0,
respectively. In period 0, nature chooses a skill level for each person with equal probability.
Initially no driver knows his or her own skill level, and so each person (rationally) evaluates
himself as no better or worse than average. In period 1, everyone drives and learns something
about his skill, based upon whether or not he has caused an accident. Each person is then
asked how his driving skill compares to the rest of the population. How should a driver who
2Some authors, such as Burson et al. (2005) reserve the term overcondencefor people who overestimate
their absolute abilities, but we see no reason for this restriction. In any case, the literarture uses the term
in all the ways we have listed, and more.
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has not caused an accident reply?
Using Bayesrule, he evaluates his own skill level as follows:
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Such a driver thinks there is over a 1
2
chance (in fact, 5
9
) that his skill level is in the top
third of all drivers. His mean probability of an accident is 5
9
0+ 1
3
2
5
+ 1
9
4
5
= 2
9
, which is better
than for 2
3
of the drivers, and better than the population mean. Furthermore, his beliefs
about himself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution. Any
way he looks at it, a driver who has not had an accident should evaluate himself as better
than average. Since 3
5
of drivers will not have an accident, 3
5
will rank themselves better than
average. Thus, the population of drivers will seem overcondent on the whole. However,
rather than being overcondent, which implies some error in their judgements, they will
simply be using all the information available to them in the best possible manner.
We emphasize that we are not providing an explanation for overcondence. Quite the
contrary, we are showing that, as in the above example, much of the supposed evidence
does not indicate overcondence at all; the apparent overcondence is illusory. Missing from
the discussion in the literature has been the recognition that when a person ranks himself,
this is just a summary statistic which provides only limited information about the entire
distribution of his beliefs. In the above driving example, although the statement 3
5
of the
people rank themselves above average appears to be problematic, an examination of the
complete beliefs of the population shows that there is no anomaly. Indeed, since the 2
5
of the
population that do cause an accident have beliefs I am low skill with probability 2
3
, medium
with probability 1
3
, and high with probability 0,the beliefs of the population average out
to the actual population distribution, as they should.
Moreover, we will show that not only can a majority of people rationally rank themselves
above the median, but, depending upon the denitions one adopts, even 99% of the popula-
tion can rank itself in the top 1% without any cognitive error being implied. Moreover, the
failure to properly frame the issue has led authors to make plausible sounding statements
that are simply wrong, such as Camerers (1997, p. 173) claim that two rms cannot both
think they are each more likely to have the most skill (assuming a common prior). We will
return to Camerers claim in Section 1.3.
In some experiments, subjects are asked to take actions, rather than answer questions.
Overcondence is then inferred from their actions. But actions, too, provide only a summary
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statistic of beliefs, and the same errors that have been made in interpreting answers to
questionnaires have been made in interpreting the actions that subjects take.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we provide a careful
framework for analyzing overcondence. We distinguish between apparent overcondence,
which gives a possibly misleading impression of overcondence (as in the above driving
example), and (true) overcondence. We show that much of the evidence in the literature
purporting to show overcondence does nothing of the sort. In this section, we analyze
experiments in which subjects are asked to evaluate themselves. In Section 2, we look
at two papers in which subjects are asked to take actions, rather than make statements.
Using the framework developped in Section 1, we show that, despite the authorsclaims, the
experiments in these papers do not provide a proper test of overcondence. In Section 3 we
suggest two experiments that do provide a proper test of overcondence.
Recent work has challenged the universality of the nding that most people rate them-
selves as above average. In particular, there is evidence that this e¤ect is attenuated when
the attribute under consideration is objectively measurable, and even reversed when the skill
under consideration is a di¢ cult one to master. In Section 4, we provide an explanation for
these ndings. In Section 5, we discuss why it is important to distinguish between apparent
overcondence and overcondence. In Section 6, we review some of the literature.
1 Questionnaires
Consider a person who asserts I am very intelligent.How are we to tell whether or not this
condence is merited? It may well be impossible, given the vagueness of the term very.
Suppose that instead the person asserts I am more intelligent than most people. The
concept more than most is clearer than very, but the statement remains di¢ cult to
assess, since it is unclear how to measure intelligence, IQ tests notwithstanding.
Researchers have attempted to surmount these di¢ culties by considering entire popula-
tions at once. The idea is that, while it may be di¢ cult to judge whether or not a specic
individual is overcondent, it may be possible to determine that a population is overcon-
dent on the whole. For instance, if everyone in a room asserts I am denitely the most
intelligent person in this room, it could be concluded that all but one of them is overcon-
dent, at least in their evaluations of their relative abilities3 (and assuming that they agree
on what constitutes intelligence).
3Each individual may or may not also have an overated opinion of his absolute level of intelligence.
In fact, individuals may not even have a clear notion of what this absolute level is. Note that for many
economic problems, the relative ranking is the relevant one. For instance, the wisdom of attempting a career
as a professional football player, depends on a persons relative, not absolute, ability.
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This research can be divided into two types: work that proceeds by means of question-
naires and work that asks subjects to take actions. We consider the questionnaire work rst,
and subdivide this work into two categories, one ordinal and one cardinal:
1. Ranking questionnaires: People are asked to rank themselves relative to others on some
attribute (I am more intelligent than 80% of the people in this room).
2. Scale questionnaires: People are asked to compare themselves to the population on a
scale (On a scale of  5 (much less intelligent than average) to 5 (much more intelligent
than average), I am a 3.
We consider the ranking literature rst.
1.1 Ranking Questions
Svensons (1981) work is a prototypical example of a ranking questionnaire. Svenson gathered
subjects into a room and presented them with the following instructions (among others):
We would like to know about what you think about how safely you drive an
automobile. All drivers are not equally safe drivers. We want you to compare
your own skill to the skills of the other people in this experiment. By denition,
there is a least safe and a most safe driver in this room. We want you to indicate
your own estimated position in this experimental group. Of course, this is a
di¢ cult question because you do not know all the people gathered here today,
much less how safely they drive. But please make the most accurate estimate
you can.
Each subject was then asked to place himself or herself into a safety decile. In one respect,
Svenson was very careful. Realizing that the subjects had little information about the other
drivers in the room, he explicitly stated: Of course, this is a di¢ cult question because you
do not know all the people gathered here today, much less how safely they drive. But there
is another aspect he left unaddressed: Does a driver know how safely he himself drives? Of
course, a driver has more information about himself than about a stranger (for instance,
he knows the number of accidents he has had), but there is no reason to presume that he
knows precisely how safe his driving is (even assuming that he knows exactly what it means
to drive safely)4. This raises the question of what exactly a respondent means when he
ranks himself as being, say, in the 7th decile of drivers when it comes to safety.
4One well-recognized problem with interpreting Svensons data is that people may have di¤erent notions
of what it means to drive safely (see Dunning (1993)). Here, we give the best case for the data and assume
that all subjects agree on the meaning.
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To isolate the nature of the problem, let us consider a more carefully delineated problem.
Suppose a subject is asked to rank her reaction time. She is told that reaction time is
measured to the nearest tenth of a second, and that it varies in the general population
uniformly from 1 second to 0:1 seconds, so that, for instance, a time of :3 seconds places
a person in the 8th decile (smaller reaction times are better). She is asked to estimate her
position in the population. Suppose that her beliefs about her own reaction time are given
by Chart I below (she estimates that with probability 0:16, her reaction time is :5 seconds,
with probability 0:2 her reaction time is :4 seconds, etc...). The chart also lists population
deciles.
Reaction Time 1 :9 :8 :7 :6 :5 :4 :3 :2 :1
Prob. own time 0 0 0 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:20 0:30 0:02 0
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Chart I
In what decile will she place herself? Three reasonable answers immediately come to
mind, corresponding to three common notions of average.
() She can reasonably place herself in the 7th decile. After all, there is over a 50% chance
that her reaction time will be :4 or better, and this is the fastest time for which she
can make such a claim. Another way of saying this is that :4 is the median of her
distribution, and this places her in the 7th decile .
() She can reasonably place herself in the 6th decile. After, all :462 is her mean reaction
time, which rounds up to :5 which is in the 6th decile.
() She can reasonably place herself in the 8th decile. After all, her modal time :3 places
her in the 8th decile.
Certainly, this list is not exhaustive. Thus, when a person places herself in a certain
decile, we, as researchers, have no real way of knowing the signicance of her answer. Is
there a corrector rationalanswer? No; she is being asked to summarize her beliefs with
a single parameter, but no single reply supplies the best information for all circumstances.
For instance, if she is risk-neutral, and we are interested in knowing whether she would place
an even money bet that her reaction time is better than that of x% of the population, then
her median belief provides the requisite information. On the other hand, if we would like
to know whether she would place a bet where she receives a payment based on how much
faster or slower she is than other people, her mean answer may be more informative. If she
is not risk-neutral, then no single parameter may be of much use.
Returning to Svensons driving question, a person may consider herself to be quite a
safe and skillful driver since she has never had an accident and always manoeuvres well in
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tra¢ c, but at the same time realize that her limited experience restricts her ability to make
a precise self-appraisal. In ranking herself, she must estimate her own ability as well as that
of the others in the room. As a result, it is unclear what to make of her answer to Svensons
question and, hence, of Svensons data. Rather than ascribe a particular meaning, we will
consider several possibilities.
1.1.1 Population Median Data
Consider a population where each person is asked to rank his or her skill level relative to the
other people in the population. (We use the word skillloosely here to denote the attribute
under consideration.) The literature is not always very careful in dening when this popu-
lation displays overcondence (or, equivalently for this paper, when the population displays
the so-called better-than-average e¤ect), but the general idea is that there is overcondence
if, as Myers (1999; p:57) writes, most people see themselves as better than average.
An immediate di¢ culty with this formulation is the ambiguity in the notion of average
does this refer to the mean or the median? It is easy to see that the mean cannot possibly
provide the right denition, at least when the underlying trait distribution may be skewed.
For example, in a population of ten people, one who has scored 0 on a test, and nine who
have scored 50, the nine have, in fact, performed better than the mean, so there is certainly
nothing wrong in them believing that they have. Thus, Denition 1 below, which uses the
median, is what the literature has in mind, whether explicitly or implicitly.5
Given a set of individuals who are asked to rank themselves, let population median data
x be the fraction of people who rank themselves strictly above the median.
Denition 1 Population median data x is apparently overcondent if x > 1
2
.
The reader will have noticed that we have used the word apparently in the above
denition. To understand the reason, we must ask why a population that ranks itself highly
on average should be called overcondent, rather than simply condent. Clearly, the idea
is that in an overcondent population, there is something incorrect, or at the very least
inconsistent, in peoples self-evaluations. To determine if a population that is apparently
overcondent is truly overcondent, we need a notion of what it means for peoples self-
evaluations to be correct and consistent. Fortunately, we have such a notion readily available,
given by the Harsanyi common prior approach in which nature picks a skill level, or type,
for each person, and over time each person receives information about her type and updates
her beliefs about herself using Bayesrule. We formalize this below.
5For instance, Hoelzl and Rustichini say that a population exhibits overcondence if a majority of people
estimates their skills or abilities to be better than the median.
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Denition 2 A signalling structure is a triplet  = (S;; f), where S is a set of signals,
  R is a type space, and f = ffg2 is a collection of probability distributions over S:
If, for example, S is nite, f (s) is the probability that a person of type  receives the
signal s.
 Throughout this paper we interpret higher types as more skillful.
Denition 3 A signalling model consists of a population of individuals, a signalling struc-
ture  = (S;; f), and a type  2  for each individual such that:
i) The distribution of types in the population has a unique median.
ii) Each person knows the distribution of types in the population; initially, each persons
belief about her own type is given by this distribution.
ii) An individual of type , receives the signal s 2 S according to the probability distribution
f.
iii) Each person updates her initial beliefs using Bayesrule.
This denition of a signalling model reects a standard approach to a situation of incom-
plete information, but since variations are possible within this standard, a few comments
are in order. The unique median merely avoids uninteresting complications. Although it
is not necessary to do, we posit that each individual knows the distribution of types in the
population. On the one hand, this is certainly a plausible condition. For instance, an indi-
vidual might know the distribution of the number of accidents a person can expect to have
in a lifetime, or the distribution of IQs in the population, without knowing either gure
for herself.6 More importantly, this condition makes our task more di¢ cult: we will show
that apparently overcondent data can rationally arise, even if everyone has a perfect un-
derstanding of the level of skills in the population.7 Note that, although it is not explicit in
the denition of a signalling model, a dynamic time structure is allowed. In particular, the
signal that an individual receives may consist of various pieces of information obtained over
time (for instance, from her driving experience).
This is quite a rational model; indeed for many it is the denition of full rationality. As
such, it provides a proper foundation for judging the rationality of a population. Note that
since agents in a signalling model use Bayesrule, for a large population their beliefs average
out to the (true) population distribution.
6In experiments, the comparison population is sometimes the group of subjects in the room. Even if
a subject knows the skill distribution in the general population (or relevant subpopulation, for instance,
students), he may not know the distribution of skills in the room. However, the best case for the validity of
an experiment is when the subject group is large enough to be representative of the larger population.
7By the same token, the assumption of a unique median also makes our task more di¢ cult.
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The following proposition indicates that apparent overcondence is incompatible with
rationality when people know their skill levels exactly.
Proposition 1 Consider a signaling model. If everybodys updated beliefs after receiving
their signals are degenerate, the population median data cannot be apparently overcondent.
Proof. All proofs not in the text are in the appendix
If people are certain of their types, then a strict majority of them cannot rationally
believe they are better than the median.8 However, this is a rather implausible condition 
in most, if not all, situations each person will have only an imperfect indication of his own
skill.9 How imperfect can a rational personsself-knowledge be? A priori, it seems di¢ cult to
require more of a rational population than that its members derive their beliefs in a rational
and consistent manner; that is, that they derive them from a signalling model.
In ranking questionnaires, people do not report their full beliefs, but only a ranking.
Rational and consistent individuals report rankings that come from beliefs that are derived
from a signalling model; however, as discussed in the previous section, there are many
legitimate ways to report a ranking derived from a particular belief. Therefore, in interpreting
ranking data we need to consider several possibilities.
Suppose that people use their median beliefs about themselves in their self-evaluations (as
in  of Section 1.1). The next denition says that a fraction x can rationally and consistently
report themselves as being better than the population median, if, starting from a common
prior, and using Bayesrule, a fraction x can come to believe their median type is better
than the population median.
Denition 4 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which x is the expected fraction of people who will believe that their median type is
strictly greater than the population median, after receiving their signals and updating.
(More formally, x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling model as follows: Let
m be the median of the prior p. Let Smed  S be the set of signals such that an individual
who receives a signal s 2 Smed has a median belief about himself that is strictly greater than
the population median. Thus, s 2 Smed if and only if P (  m j s) < 12 : Let F denote the
8Propostion 1 remains true if we modify the denition of a signalling model to allow people to be uncertain
of the population distribution. For instance, nature could pick one of several population distributions with
probabilities that are common knowledge.
9Many authors explicitly acknowledge that people are not likely to be certain of their skill levels. Thus,
Alicke et al. (1995) ask subjects to make point estimatesof their skill, while Hoelzl and Rusticcini (2005)
note that a subject in their experiment has only some idea of his skills in it. However, these and other
authors do no fully explore the implications of this uncertainty.
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probability distribution of the signals in S, often called the marginal. That is, for each
(measurable) T  S let
F (T ) =
Z

Z
T
df (s) dp ()
Then, x can be -rationalized if x = F (Smed).)
In a stochastic environment, it is possible to explaina wide range of experimental data
as the outcome of a random, although possibly unlikely, process. Denition 4 avoids this
cheatby insisting that the data x be the expected fraction of people who believe themselves
to be above average. This can also be interpreted as restricting ourselves to data that comes
from large populations.10 Thus, Denition 4 is a demanding notion of rationalizing. When
people self-evaluate using their median types and the data can be -rationalized, there is no
reason prima facie case for calling it overcondent.
The following denition is for a population in which people use their mean beliefs about
themselves (as in  of Section 1.1) for their self-evaluations.
Denition 5 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which x is the expected fraction of people who will believe that their mean type is
strictly greater than the population median, after receiving their signals and updating.
Although reporting a modal belief strikes us a plausible way to answer a questionnaire, it
also strikes us as less compelling than reporting either a median or a mean belief. Therefore,
in the interest of space, from now on we no longer consider mode reports. (Considering mode
reports would not modify our results in any essential way.) Instead, we turn to a slightly
di¤erent approach than the one we have adopted so far.
It is reasonable for a person with no information about herself, other than that she is
a random member of the population, to rate herself as average.11 Suppose the person now
receives a signal that causes her beliefs about her own type to strictly rst order stochastically
dominate the population distribution. It is natural for this person to now rank herself above
the median person.12 This leads to the following denition.
Denition 6 Population median data x can be -rationalized if there exists a signalling
model in which x is the expected fraction of people who, after receiving their signals and
10In Section 1.3 we briey discuss small populations, where more extreme data can be rationalized.
11A person who has no private information about herself and who self-evaluates using the median of her
type, ranks herself as equal to the population median; if she uses her mean type, she ranks herself as equal to
the population median if the prior is symmetric, but not necessarily otherwise (which may be an argument
against the reasonableness of the mean).
12Note, however, that if the population distribution is not symmetric, the fact that a persons beliefs about
herself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution does not imply that either her
median or mean type is strictly better than the population median type.
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updating, will have beliefs about their own type that strictly rst order stochastically dominate
the population distribution.
The existing literature assumes that apparent overcondence implies cognitive errors,
or inconsistencies, on the part of (some) respondents without considering the meaning of
their replies. In our terms, the literature assumes that apparent overcondence implies that
the data cannot be rationalized without specifying which sense of rationalizing. In some
cases, there may be a reason to focus on a particular sense (as in Section 2.2). Absent such
a reason, a stringent denition of overcondence requires that population median data be
called overcondent only when it cannot be rationalized using any of the above concepts, for
only then can we be sure that there is a problemwith the data13; a lax denition requires
only that data be called overcondent when it cannot be rationalized using at least one of
the concepts.
Denition 7 Population median data x is strongly overcondent if it is apparently over-
condent and it cannot be -rationalized, and cannot be -rationalized, and cannot be -
rationalized.
Denition 8 Population median data x is weakly overcondent if it is apparently over-
condent and it cannot be -rationalized, or it cannot be -rationalized, or it cannot be
-rationalized.
In a symmetric signalling model, the population distribution is symmetric.14 In what
follows, we will note when the data can (also) be rationalized by a symmetric signalling
model (and hence the rationalizing does not depend upon a discrepancy between the mean
and median).
Theorem 1 Ostensible overcondence of population median data x implies weak overcon-
dence only if x = 1. Put di¤erently, it is possible to -rationalize, and -rationalize, and
-rationalize any fraction x 2  1
2
; 1

rating themselves above the median. Moreover, these
rationalizations can be done with symmetric signalling models.
If people know the general distribution of skills in the population, and learn about their
own skills over time, there is nothing wrong with a strict majority of them ranking themselves
above the median. Thus, apparent overcondence should not be used as an indication of
overcondence. For instance, Svensons (1981) nding that a majority of subjects regarded
13In fact, even then we could not be sure as there could be still other reasonable ways for people to evaluate
themselves.
14If P is the distribution, and h is the midpoint of the support , P (  h  y) = P (  h+ y) for all y.
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themselves as more skillful and less risky than the average driver is unproblematic. Note
that Theorem 1 restricts x to be greater than 1
2
only because we are concentrating on
overcondence. The theorem remains true for all x 2 (0; 1), so that apparent undercondence
is also not problematic. Although the three notions of rationalizing used in Theorem 1 are
independent of each other, the drivers example in the introduction illustrates the theorem
for all three.
The above theorem concerns a population of individuals who place themselves relative to
the median person. The next theorem is even more dramatic: almost everyone can rationally
believe that their mean skill level is strictly higher than the skill level of any fraction of the
population (even if the population distribution is symmetric).
Theorem 2 Data in which any fraction x 2 (0; 1) of the population ranks itself strictly
higher than any fraction q 2 (0; 1) of the population can be -rationalized by a signalling
model. In particular, 99% of the people can rationally believe that their mean skill level is
strictly higher than the skill level of 99% of the people. Moreover, this rationalizing can be
done with a symmetric signalling model.
1.1.2 Population Ranking Data
Although the results of ranking experiments are typically summarized by the number of
people who rank themselves above the median, most of these experiments collect more de-
tailed data, such as the deciles into which subjects place themselves. While the previous
section shows that population median data is essentially useless for determining whether or
not people are overcondent, this more complete data is potentially helpful.
Suppose that each person is asked to place himself into a k-cile, where to be in the
jth k-cile means that the person ranks himself above the fraction j 1
k
of the population, and
below the fraction j
k
. Population ranking data is a vector x 2 Rk; Pk1 xi = 1, where xi;
i = 1; :::; k is the fraction of people who rank themselves in the ith k-cile. By denition, the
actual fraction of people that lies in each k-cile is 1
k
. We have the following:
Denition 9 The population ranking data x is apparently overcondent if x strictly rst
order stochastically dominates
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k

:
If neither one of x and
 
1
k
; :::; 1
k

rst order stochastically dominates the other, then
the data has neither an unambiguously overcondent nor undercondent appearance. For
instance, the data
 
1
5
; 1
5
; 3
10
; 0; 3
10

contains a disproportionately large number of people who
consider themselves to be in the top fth, but a disproportionately small number who place
themselves in the top two fths.
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Denition 10 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if there exists a sig-
nalling model in which the expected number of people who believe their median type is in the
jth k-cile is xj; j = 1; :::; k.
The following theorem says that, when people report the median of their beliefs, a rational
population can be twice as condentas reality would suggest, but no more. For instance,
suppose that people place themselves into deciles (k = 10). Then apparently overcondent
data in which 2
10
of the people rank themselves in the top decile, 4
10
rank themselves in the
top two deciles, and 2i
10
rank themselves in the top i decile for i = 3; 4; 5 can be rationalized.
However, data in which 3
10
of the population place themselves in the top decile can not
be explained as rational. (Although we have been emphasizing overcondent looking data,
there is a similar constraint put on undercondent looking data, and that is captured by
the second inequality in the theorem.) Let dne denote the least integer weakly greater than
n 2 R:
Theorem 3 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if and only if
kX
i
xj  2
k
(1 + k   i) , i =

k + 1
2

; :::; k and
iX
1
xj  2
k
i, i = 1; :::;

k   1
2

Moreover, the rationalizing can be done with a symmetric signalling model.
Corollary 1 Population ranking data in which the median declared placement is as high as
the 75th percentile, but no higher, can be -rationalized.
While almost everyone can rationally think they are better than the median, only half
can rationally think they are better than the 75th percentile.
Theorem 3 provides some hope for detecting overcondence by the use of ranking ques-
tionnaires. It is worth looking at Svensons data in greater detail than that provided by his
population median data. Svenson questioned students in Sweden and the United States, ask-
ing them both about their driving safety and driving skill. Swedish drivers placed themselves
into deciles in the following proportions when asked about their safety:
Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Reports (%) 0:0 5:7 0:0 14:3 2:9 11:4 14:3 28:6 17:1 5:7
We rst note that although the population ranking data has an overcondent feel to it,
the data is not, strictly speaking, apparently overcondent, since fewer than 10% of the
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population ranks itself in the top 10%. More importantly, Theorem 3 implies that the data
can be -rationalized, so that it is not indicative of cognitive biases.15 Note, for instance,
that while 65:7% of the people rank themselves among the top 40%, Theorem 3 would allow
up to 80% to rationally do so. Furthermore, the median ranking is between the seventh and
eighth decile, which Corollary 1 permits of a rational population. In fact, out of Svensons
four questions, only half yield answers that cannot be -rationalized namely, the American
answers. The median safety placement for American students is between 81% and 90%,
which violates Corollary 1. While the median skill placement is in the acceptable 61  70%
range, 46% of the population places itself in the top 20% of skill level, which is too many
to -rationalize. Thus, Svenson does nd some evidence of overcondence (if his subjects
based their answers on their median types), but it is not as strong as commonly believed.
Note that when 46% of the population place themselves in the top 20% this is only 6% too
many, not 26%.
Theorem 3 is our rst positive result: if people self-evaluate using their median rank-
ings, then questionnaires have the potential to detect overcondence. Unfortunately, our
next result indicates that if people use their mean rankings, then even the more complete
population ranking data is useless.16
Denition 11 The population ranking data x can be -rationalized if there exists a sig-
nalling model in which the expected number of people who believe their mean type is in the
jth k-cile is xj; j = 1; :::; k.
Theorem 4 Any population ranking data can be -rationalized.
1.1.3 Reasonableness
The previous discussion has been in the rather abstract language of signalling models. Some
readers may wonder if the results somehow depend upon bizarresignalling structures. In
this section, we address this concern.
One obvious reason for a person to consider herself a safe driver is that she has not had
any accidents. Thinking of driving as a test, and not having an accident as passing the
test, motivates the next denition.
Denition 12 A testing model consists of a test, a population of individuals, a type space
[0; 1], and a (prior) probability distribution p over [0; 1] with unique median such that:
15Theorem 4 below shows that the data can be  rationalized as well.
16Theorem 4 is the rst result that relies on a signalling model that is not symmetric. This could be
considered to be a aw, if there is a reason to believe that the trait under consideration is symmetrically
distributed in the population. As far as we know, no one in the literature has argued that their data is
signifcant because the trait distriubtion is symmetric.
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i) Nature chooses a type  2 [0; 1] for each individual independently according to the prior p;
initially, each persons beliefs about his own type are described by p.
ii) Each person takes the test. A person of type , passes the test with probability  and fails
with probability 1  :
iii) Each person updates his beliefs about himself using Bayesrule.
A testing model is a natural and simple signalling model. In a symmetric testing model,
the prior distribution is symmetric.
Theorem 5 Population median data x, for any x 2 (0; 1), can be -rationalized, -rationalized,
and -rationalized by a symmetric testing model. Furthermore, data in which any fraction
x 2 (0; 1) of the population rank themselves strictly above any fraction q 2 (0; 1) of the
population can be -rationalized by a symmetric testing model.
Theorem 5 implies Theorems 1 and 2 of Section 1.1.1. As it depends only upon a
symmetric testing model, which is quite simple and straightforward, it shows that those
results do not depend upon a strained signalling model.
While the simplicity of a testing model is a virtue, it has a cost: since it involves only two
signals, pass and fail, it can only generate data in which the populations updated beliefs
divide into at most two sets. Thus, while population median data can be rationalized by
a testing model, population ranking data in which the population places itself into more
than two k-ciles (k > 2) cannot be. At the same time, a driver, for example, self-evaluates
using not only the number of accidents she has had, but also the number of near-accidents,
her beliefs about her reexes and eyesight, and myriad other factors, which may be better
captured by the abstractness of a signalling model than by a more concretely specied model.
What makes for a reasonable signalling model? A plausible restriction is that better types
should be more likely to receive better signals (for instance, a relatively safe driver should
expect to have relatively few accidents and near-accidents). More precisely, we say that
a signalling model, with signalling structure (S;; f), is f-reasonable if 1; 2 2 ; 1 <
2 implies that f2 f.o.s.d. f1. The following proposition shows that this restriction has
implications for population ranking data.
Proposition 2 For small enough "; the population ranking data
 
"; "; 1
2
  "; 1
2
  " cannot
be  rationalized by a signalling model that is f-reasonable.
Proposition 2 stands in contrast to Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 of Section 1.1.2. This
proposition leaves open the possibility that population ranking data might be more useful
than is implied by those theorems. For instance, one might hope to argue that Svensons
Swedish data is, in fact, indicative of some overcondence, as it could not be rationalized
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by a reasonablesignalling model. While this possibility is intriguing, the following result
shows that it is not immediate what form such an argument would take.17
Example 1 The data x =
 
1
8
; 1
8
; 3
8
; 3
8

can be  rationalized by a signalling model that
is f-reasonable. For instance, let the type space be  = [0; 4], let the set of signals be
S = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and let the probability with which type  receives signal s be given by, for
any "  1
6
, fi:
f (s)
 2 [0; 1) =
8><>:
1
4
+ " s = 1
1
4
  " s = 2
1
4
s = 3; 4
;
f (s)
 2 [1; 2) =
8><>:
1
4
  " s = 1
1
4
+ " s = 2
1
4
s = 3; 4
f (s)
 2 [2; 3) =
(
3
4
s = 3
1
4
s = 4
,
f (s)
 2 [3; 4] =
(
1
4
s = 3
3
4
s = 4
Finally, let the population be uniformly distributed on . Then, 1
8
of the population receives
the signal 1, 1
8
the signal 2, 3
8
the signal 3 and 3
8
the signal 4. An individual who receives the
signal i has a median type that places him in the ith quartile. The population (rationally)
reports the data
 
1
8
; 1
8
; 3
8
; 3
8

.
The next theorem shows that when it comes to -rationalizing, f-reasonableness imposes
no additional restrictions.
Theorem 6 Any data x with xi 2 (0; 1) for all i can be  rationalized with an f reasonable
signalling model.
1.2 Scale Questions
In scale questionnaires, participants are asked to make evaluations using a scale. There are
variations, but in the version we consider people are asked to compare themselves to the
average person on a designated scale.18 For instance, Alicke et al. (1995) present subjects
17The technically minded reader will notice that the information structure of Example 1 does not sat-
isfy the maximum likelihood ratio property (mlrp): for some 0 > , f0 (s)f(s) is not increasing. In par-
ticular, 3 = f2(3)f0(3) >
f2(4)
f0(4)
= 1. The failure to satisfy the mlrp is not a problem, however, since the
mlrp is just a means to an end, namely, that high signals are good news, and higher signals are
good news in the example, since the posteriors from higher signals f.o.s.d the posteriors from lower sig-
nals. For example, p ( 2 [0; 1)j3) = p ( 2 [1; 2)j3) = 16 , p ( 2 [2; 3)j3) = 12 , p ( 2 [3; 4j3) = 16 , while
p ( 2 [0; 1)j4) = p ( 2 [1; 2)j4) = p ( 2 [2; 3)j3) = 16 ; p ( 2 [3; 4j3) = 12 .
18In a common variant each person places him or herself on a scale from 1 to T and indicates the fraction
of the population that falls into each scale position. This is formally equivalent for dening ostensible
overcondence. However, the notions of rationalizing becomes relatively involved, as the di¤erent population
distributions must also be explained.
16
with a personality trait, such as intelligence or dependability, and ask them to rate the
extent to which the trait describe(s) themselves relative to the average college student of the
same sex, on a single 9-point scale (0=much less than the average college student;4=about
the same as the average college student;8=much more than the average college student).
More generally, in a scale survey (of this type), a comparison scale T and average
m are specied, and each person i is asked to compare himself to this average by choosing an
xi 2 T . Population scale data is a quadruple (T;m; n; x) ; where T  R is the scale used
in the questionnaire, m 2 T is the specied scale average, n is the number of individuals,
and x = 1
n
Pn
i=1 xi, where each xi 2 T . The literature uses the notion that the population
scale data is apparently overcondent if x > m.
Before proceeding, we must note that the fundamental methodology in many scale ques-
tionnaires seems a bit dubious. The basic idea, apparently, is that in a rational population,
the answers given should average out. But given the subjective nature of many of these
scales, it is unclear why this should be so, even when there is no uncertainty at all and
everyone is in perfect agreement. Imagine the following question posed to two drummers, A
and B, in a room:
On an integer scale from  5 (much worse), 0 (the same) to 5 (much better),
please rate yourself as a drummer compared to the other drummer.
Suppose that, as it happens, both A and B are of the opinion that the only skill that
matters in a drummer is accurate time keeping. Furthermore, they both agree that As time
keeping is 80% accurate, while Bs is 30% accurate. There seems to be little scope for true
overcondence (or undercondence). There also seems to be nothing wrong with A rating
himself with a 4, and B rating herself with a  2. After all, the scale markings are subjective.
Nonetheless, the standard measure indicates overcondence since the average rating is 1, not
0.19
Despite our reservations, we will proceed as if the scales are interpreted in a consistent
manner by all concerned. Alternatively, we will only be considering scale questionnaires in
which there is an objective scale. As an example, Weinstein (1980) asks students how their
chances of obtaining a good job o¤er before graduation compare to those of other students
at their college, with choices ranging from 100% less than average to 5 times the average.
Here, there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the scale, but another ambiguity remains;
namely, what is meant by an average student?20
19There are still other potential problems with scale questions. For instance, Schwarz et al. (1991) ask
subjects how successful they have been in life, and nd that answers di¤er signicantly depending upon
whether subjects are presented with a scale from  5 to 5, or 0 to 10.
20Weinstein asks subjects to compare themselves to other Cook studentsusing terms such as 50% less
than average. Alicke et al. ask their subjects to compare themselves to the average student.
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As we saw, in ranking questionnaires the median is the only notion of an average that
it is reasonable for us to consider.21 It turns out that in scale questionnaires only the mean
provides a useful notion, although it is reasonable for respondents to use either notion.
To illustrate the issue, suppose, for the sake of discussion, that all of Weinsteins subjects
agree that there are two types of students at their college, low and high, with job o¤er
probabilities pL = 0:3 and pH = 1, and that 80% of the population are low type. A reasonable
interpretation of an average student is one with an 0:3 chance of obtaining an o¤er. Consider
a respondent who thinks that there is a 50% chance that she is a low type. Her probability of
obtaining a good job o¤er is (:5 0:3) + (:5 1) = 0:65. A perfectly reasonable response to
Weinsteins question is that her chances are 35% above average. Note that we are claiming
that a reasonable, perhaps the most reasonable, way to answer uses the median (or mode)
in determining the population average, but the mean (of her own beliefs) for self-evaluating.
It is not necessary that the the reader accept this as the most reasonable way of answering,
merely that he or she accepts that this as a plausible way. Of course, this is not to deny
that it is also reasonable for a respondent to use the population mean in dening the average
student and her own mean for self-evaluating. Moreover, for other questions, in particular
those not involving probabilities, it may be reasonable for subjects to use their median type,
rather than mean type, when self-evaluating. Thus, just considering medians and means,
there are four ways to interpret answers to scale questions.
We will spare the reader the formalization of all four treatments. It is fairly obvious that
in the two cases where people self-evaluate using the median of their beliefs, apparent over-
condence does not imply overcondence, since there is no particular reason why weighted
sum of medians should equal the population mean or median. Example 2 shows that the same
holds true when people self-evaluate using their mean belief, and the population average
is taken to be the median.
the population average represents the median. Theorem 7 below covers the fourth case.
Example 2 Consider an experiment in which 150 subjects are asked to compare themselves
to others on a scale T = f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g, where 5 is average, 0 indicates much below
average, and 10 indicates much above average. Suppose that the number of people who
place themselves at 5 is 50, and that for each of 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 the number is 20. Clearly,
the data is apparently overcondent, since nobody places himself below the average, and 2/3
of the people place themselves strictly above. We now show how to rationally explain this
data when the average 5 represents the median type, and respondents self-evaluate using their
mean type.
21More precisely, if the trait described is not symmetrically distributed, there is no reason for 50% of the
people to be ranked above the mean. If the trait is symmetrically distributed, then the mean equals the
median anyway.
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Suppose that, in fact, of the 150 subjects, 90 are 5s and 60 are 10s. Note that the median
type is 5. This general information is common knowledge. Beyond this, each person receives
a signal giving him further information about his own type. The set of signals is S =
f0; 1; :::; 9; 10g and, for the two types in the population, the probability of receiving a signal
are given by:
f5 (s) =
8><>:
0 s < 5
5
9
s = 5
20 2i
45
s > 5
and f10 (s) =
(
0 s  5
i 5
15
s > 5
Some simple calculations show that the expected number of people who will receive the signal 5
is 50, and that any one receiving this signal knows that his type is 5. For each i = 6; :::10, the
expected number who will receive the signal is 20, and, using Bayesrule, a person receiving
the signal i has a mean type of i. Therefore, we expect 50 people to rationally rate themselves
as 5s, and 20 people to rationally rate themselves each of 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10, as reported in
the experiment.
The next theorem contrasts markedly with this result. It shows that if average is
interpreted as the mean of the population, and people self-evaluate using the mean of their
beliefs, then apparent overcondence implies overcondence. More precisely, consider a
population whose mean type is m, and whose members know the overall distribution of
types and learn about themselves over time. If individuals report their mean type, then at
any point in time, the expected average report must be m: Therefore, if the population is
large enough it will not display apparent overcondence.
Theorem 7 Consider a population where individual i = 1; :::; n is of type ti 2 T  R, and m
is the mean type. Suppose that each person knows the distribution of types in the population
and receives a signal about his own type. Then E
 
1
n
Pn
i=1
ti

= m, where ti is the mean of
person is updated beliefs.
Theorem 7 provides the rst case where the standard interpretation of the data found in
the literature has merit. Weinstein nds that his subjects display apparent overcondence.
If we assume that his subjects consider the average subject to be represented by the mean of
the population, and that they self-evaluate using their mean type, then his subjects also dis-
play overcondence.22 Since Weinstein asks his subjects for probability information, it does
seem most reasonable to interpret their responses as reecting their mean self-evaluations.
However, as we argued earlier, it may be more reasonable to assume that subjects consider
the average type to be the population median, rather than mean.
22On the other hand, as a psychological matter, asking subjects for probabillity information in and of itself
may lead to dubious replies.
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1.3 Small Samples
As we discussed in Section 1.1.1, our denitions of rationalizing, which rely on expected
data, can be understood as implicitly insisting that the data be generatable by innitely
large populations. Naturally, an experimenter prefers to have as large a subject pool as
possible, so that her results cannot be dismissed as a statistical aberration (or experimental
error). Thus, our implicit assumption that the data comes from an innitely large population
provides the best case for the data. Nonetheless, actual experimental populations are, of
course, nite, and many experiments involve quite small numbers. It is worth noting that
nite samples permit data that is even more (seemingly) anomalous.
Consider the following quote from Camerer (1997):
The now-standard approach to games of imperfect information pioneered by
John Harsanyi presumes that players begin with a common priorprobability
distribution over any chance outcomes. As an example, consider two rms A
and B, who are debating whether to enter a new industry like Internet software.
Suppose it is common knowledge that only one rm will survive-the rm with
more skilled managers, say- so rms judge the chance that their managers are
the more skilled. The common prior assumption insists both rms cannot think
they are each more likely to have the most skill.
This statement is simply wrong. We now show that, using the standard approach,each
of two rms can, in fact, concurrently believe that it is more likely to be the more skillful.
Furthermore, this state of a¤airs can arise with probability arbitrarily close to one. The
following is a simple and straightforward model yielding this result.
1. Nature moves rst. With probability 1
2
, Firm 1 has high skill, Firm 2 has low skill;
with probability 1
2
Firm 1 has low skill, Firm 2 has high skill. Both rms know this,
but neither is told Natures choice.
2. Each rm takes a test. The high skill rm passes with probability ph, the low skill rm
passes with probability pl, where ph > pl.
3. Each rm uses Bayesrule to determine the probability that it is the more skillful.
Proposition 3 For any p 2 (0; 1), the parameters in the above model can be chosen so that
with probability p each rm will believe there is strictly more than a 1
2
chance that it is the
more skillful. In particular, the parameters can be chosen so that with a 50% chance each
rm will believe there is a 2
3
chance that it is the more skillful; in order for the chance to be
more than 50%, the belief must be smaller than 2
3
, in order for the belief to be greater than
2
3
, the chance must be less than 50%:
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Proof of Proposition 3. The probability that a rm that passes the test is high skill
is:
p ( = H j pass) =
1
2
ph
1
2
ph +
1
2
pl
>
1
2
The probability that both rms past the test is phpl. Fixing p  pl < pp (to ensure that
1  ph > pl), and setting ph = ppl establishes the rst part.
To establish the second part, note that the solution to the problem
max
pl;ph
1
2
ph
1
2
ph +
1
2
pl
subject to phpl  12 and ph > pl; is 23 at ph = 1; pl = 12 .
As an illustration, if ph = 0:99 and pl = 0:98, then with probability 0:97 both rms will
pass the test and each will believe there is a 0:502 chance that it is the more skillful; if ph = 1
and pl = 0:5, then with probability 12 each of the two rms will simultantously believe it has
a 2
3
chance of being the more skillful.
We note that the rst part of the proposition has nothing to do with there being two
rms an arbitrary nite number of rms can all believe they are the best rm with any
probability p 2 (0; 1).
2 Actions
We have emphasized the ambiguity inherent in the interpretation of replies to questionnaires.
A di¤erent approach to the study of overcondence circumvents this ambiguity by asking
subjects to take actions. The subjectsbeliefs are then inferred from their actions. In this
section we look at two such studies.
2.1 Entry
In an oft-cited paper, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) test for overcondence using an experiment
meant to model rmsentry decisions. N subjects (rms) must decide whether to play
In or Out. After the entry decisions are made, the subjects who have played In are ranked.
The payo¤ to playing In is greater than the payo¤ to playing Out if and only if an entrant
is ranked in the top k < N (hence, all subjects who play In do better than all subjects who
play Out if fewer than k choose In). There are two treatments.
1. Treatment 1. The subjects who play In are ranked randomly.
2. Treatment 2. The subjects who play In are ranked according to their results on a skill
or trivia test. (The test is administered after the entry decisions, but subjects are given
sample questions beforehand).
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Since the number of subjects that can protably play In is independent of the treatment,
the authors test for overcondence on the part of subjects by testing if the number of
entrants is greater under Treatment 2 than under Treatment 1.23 They nd that, indeed,
more subjects enter under the second treatment than the rst. But is this an indication of
overcondence, with its implication of irrationality, or apparent overcondence, with no such
implication?24
We now show that if more rms enter under Treatment 2 than Treatment 1, this only
shows apparent overcondence.
We proceed with a slightly simpler setup than the one used by Camerer and Lovallo;
the basic methodology and conclusions remain valid for their more intricate setup. Suppose
there are two subjects (N = 2), and that only one of them can protably play In (k = 1).
Specically, if both subjects enter, the higher ranked one earns 1, the lower ranked one loses
3. A subject who enters alone, again earns 1. A subject who does not enter earns 0. We can
write the subjective expected payo¤ matrixfor the game as follows, where pi is a subject
is belief that he or she will be the higher ranked:
In Out
In p1   3 (1  p1) ; p2   3 (1  p2) 1; 0
Out 0; 1 0; 0
Since there are only two participants, the two treatments in this case are:
1. Under Treatment 1, if both rms enter, the higher ranked subject is randomly chosen
with probability 1
2
.
2. Under Treatment 2, if both rms enter, their ranking is determined by a trivia test.
The test is administered only after entry decisions have been made, but each subject
is shown a sample question before.
To explain Camerer and Lovallos nding of more entry under Treatment 2 than Treat-
ment 1 as the result of apparent overcondence, rather than overcondence, we must specify
a signalling model (preferably, a reasonableone); Section 1.3 provides one. Suppose that,
before seeing the sample question, each subject believes there is a 1
2
chance that he will do
better on the test, and (correctly) believes that if he is to do better (resp., worse) on the
23As they write The di¤erence in the number of entrants in the random and skill conditions is the primary
measure of interest.
24In fact, as a test of any kind of overcondence, the results of the paper are muddied by several com-
plicating issues, including the risk attitudes of the participants and their ability to play to an equilibrium.
We consider the best case scenario (for their paper) in which participants are risk-neutral and play to an
equilibrium.
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test, he will know the answer to the sample question with probability ph (resp, pl, pl < ph).
Suppose also that phpl > 12 , so that there is a greater than 50% chance that both subjects
will correctly answer the test (and each will think he is likely to be the more skillful).
We nd symmetric equilibria of the games induced by the two treatments:
1. Under the rst treatment, each subject enters with probability 1
2
. The expected number
of subjects that enters is 1.
2. Under the second treatment, each subject adopts the following strategy: If I pass the
test, I enter with probability ph+pl
4phpl
> 1
2
, if I fail the test I do not enter. The expected
number of rms that enter is 1
4phpl
(ph + pl)
2.
Note that 1
4phpl
(ph + pl)
2 > 1. Therefore, an experimenter should expect to nd that more
subjects enter under Treatment 2 than under Treatment 1, but this is only an indication of
apparent overcondence, not overcondence.25
2.2 A Vocabulary Test
Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) divide subjects into groups and present them with two options:
1. Option 1. You will be given a monetary prize M with probability 1
2
, as determined by
the toss of a die.
2. Option 2. Everyone in your group will be administered a vocabulary test. You will be
given M if your score places you in the top half of your group.
Hoelzl and Rustichini write, Since only half of the subjects will win if the test decides
the winner, any excess over a half of the subjects voting for the test indicates an erroneous
evaluation of their own relative skills. This statement, which forms the basis of their
analysis, is incorrect.
To see why the statement is incorrect, rst note that a subject will prefer the test condi-
tion if she thinks that there is more than a 50% chance that her performance will be in the
top half. If we assume, as Hoelzl and Rusticcini do, that each person believes that test taking
ability can be summarized by a single parameter, or type, then a person will prefer the test
if the median of her beliefs about herself is better than the group median. If more than 50%
25A di¤erent test is on the expected prots that rms make, rather than the number of rms. If rms
are (truly) overcondent under Treatment 2, rather than ostensibly overcondent, they will make negative
expected prots (see Section 5). However, Camerer and Lovallo do not nd that rms make negative prots
(in the setting that does not su¤er from a self-selection problem, which is a separate issue that the authors
identify)
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of the people (strictly) prefer the test, then the population displays apparent overcondence;
this apparent overcondence indicates an erroneous evaluationonly if the data cannot be
-rationalized (given that people are using their median types). However, as Theorem 1
indicates, any amount of apparent overcondence can be -rationalized.26. Thus, there is no
error in judgement implied when more than half the subjects vote for the test.
In fact, even without the formalization in this paper, it is rather trivial to see that there
is nothing wrong with more than half the subjects voting for the test. Imagine, for the sake
of argument, 10 subjects who reach the following conclusion in the waiting room: Nine of
them are native English speakers, with a perfectly ordinary command of the language, while
one is a Haitian with a more recent knowledge of English. There is certainly nothing wrong
with the nine native speakers voting for an English vocabulary test on the grounds that this
gives each of them a 5
9
> 1
2
chance of winning the prize. Thus, the experimental design of
Hoelzl and Rustichini cannot possibly prove what they set out to prove.
The authors actually run two treatments of their experiment, one in which the vocabulary
test is easy, one in which it is di¢ cult. In both cases, subjects vote on the options before
the test is administered, but are shown sample questions (either easy or di¢ cult) before the
vote. Hoelzl and Rustichini nd that more subjects vote for the test option when the test
is easy, than when it is di¢ cult. They write Two interpretations of this result are possible.
The rst interpretation is that subjects confuse being goodwith being better... A second
interpretation is possible in terms of ambiguity aversion. In fact, a third interpretation is
possible within a completely rational framework. In Section 4.2 we show that one should
expect apparent overcondence when the test is easy and apparent undercondence when
the test is di¢ cult.27 To understand this result in the present context, imagine that the
di¢ cult (on average) test is a Haitian Creole vocabulary test. Now we should expect nine
of the subjects to vote against the test, on the grounds that it would give each of them a
4
9
< 1
2
chance of winning.
3 Testing for Overcondence
While the experiment run by Hoelzl and Rustichini does not provide a proper test of over-
condence, we now provide two modications that do provide a proper test. The validity of
both experiments derives from Theorem 8 below, which generalizes the necessary conditions
26More precisely, Theorem 1 says that any degree of ostensible overcondence short of 100% can be
-rationalized. In fact, given that any experiment must allow a margin for error, one could argue that
even 100% ostensible overcondence is not problematic. Moreover, -rationalization is (implicitly) for an
innite population; for a nite rational population 100% ostensible overcondence can be obtained without
experimental error.
27In fact, Propostion 3 can also be turned on its head to the same e¤ect.
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of Theorem 3.
First Experiment
Suppose subjects are given the following two options:
1. Option 1. You will be given a monetary prize M with probability 1
2
, determined by
the toss of a die.
2. Option 2. Everyone in your group will be administered a vocabulary test. You will be
given M if your score places you in the top x% of your group.
A subject prefers the test condition if she thinks that there is more than a 50% chance
that she will perform in the top x% of her group. That is, a person will prefer the test if her
median type is in the top x%. From Theorem 8, at most 2x% of the people can rationally
hold such a belief (at least if the population is large), so that a choice of x smaller than 50
by the experimenter provides a viable test. For instance if x = 30 so that a subject wins if
he or she places in the top 30%, then at most 60% can rationally vote for the test.28
Second Experiment
Suppose that 10 subjects are given the option between winning M with probability 6
10
,
and winningM if they place among the top 5 in a vocabulary test. As the following theorem
indicates, at most 8 of the subjects can rationally prefer the test.
Theorem 8 A fraction y or greater of a population can rationally believe that there is at
least a probability p that their types are strictly better than the worse type in the top x% of
the population if and only if py  x:
4 Ostensible Overcondence?
Recent work has questioned the universality of overcondence. In particular, there is evidence
that when the skill under consideration is objectively measurable, populations do not display
much apparent overcondence, and that they even display apparent undercondence when
the skill is a di¢ cult one to master. In this section, we explain these facts within our rational
framework.
4.1 Objectivity
Moore (2007) writes Attributes that are specic, public, and objectively measurable tend to
show the weakest BTA [better-than-average] e¤ects, whereas vague, private and subjective
28We gratuitously (since we have not run an experiment) remark that we doubt that more than 60% would
vote for the test.
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attributes tend to show the strongest BTA e¤ects. It is reasonable to presume that people
have more information and, hence, tighter estimates of their own abilities for attributes that
are more objectively measurable. The following proposition indicates that when people are
quite certain of their types, there cannot be much apparent overcondence.
For simplicity, suppose the type space  is nite. For any two probability distributions
p and q on , let the distance between them be
d (p; q) = max
j
jpj   qjj :
We say that a distribution q is  close to a degenerate if there exists a j  jj such that
for ej (the jth canonical vector) d (q; ej)  :
Proposition 4 Consider a signalling model where the proportion of individuals strictly above
the median of the population distribution is : For all " there are a  and a t such that, if at
least a fraction t of the population have beliefs, after receiving their signals, that are  close
to a degenerate, then jxm   j < " and jx   j < ", where xm (x) is the population median
data when people self-evaluate using their median type (mean type).
Recall that Proposition 1 showed that when peoples beliefs about themselves are degener-
ate the population median data cannot be apparently overcondent. Technically, Proposition
4 tells us that that result was continuous.
We motivated the above proposition with reference to objectively dened traits. On a
di¤erent dimension, people updating using Bayesrule will have tighter estimates of their skill
as they gather more information. This suggests that, if our reasoning is correct, we should
expect, say, older drivers, to display less apparent overcondence than younger drivers.
4.2 Condence and Di¢ culty
Kruger (1999) nds a below-average e¤ect in domains in which absolute skills tend to
be low. Moore (2007), summarizing similar work, writes When the task is di¢ cult or
success is rare, people believe that they are below average. Standard explanations for this
discrepancy focus on cognitive errors, such as a tendency for people to focus egocentrically
on their own skills and insu¢ ciently take into account the skills of the comparison group
(Kruger (1999)). In this section, we o¤er a rational explanation (of course).
Imagine a large pool of subjects who are informed that the level of g-ability in the
population varies uniformly from 0 to 1. Since none of them has ever heard of g-ability, each
one (rationally) considers that his or her g-ability is equally likely to be anywhere from 0 to
1. Now suppose that they are given a test which measures g-ability. They are told that the
test is an easy one: a person with ability t will pass with probability 0:7 + 0:2t.
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What will a person who passes the test conclude about his ability? He certainly will
not be surprised that he passed, since he expected to pass the test regardless of his ability.
Nonetheless, his condence in his g-ability will increase, if only slightly. More precisely,
using Bayesrule, he will ascribe probability 0:7+0:2t
:8
= 0:25t + 0:875 to being of type t. His
median type will be :53 and his mean type will be :52,29 both better than the median (or
mean) of the population. Thus, whether he ranks himself by his median type or mean type,
he will consider himself to be better than average. Furthermore, his beliefs about himself
will strictly rst order stochastically dominate the prior. But, (about) 80% of population
will pass the test, and so the population will exhibit apparent overcondence. While the
population is apparently overcondent, it is not overcondent.
Now let us change just one thing: The test is a di¢ cult one, and everyone is so informed.30
Specically, the probability of passing the test is now 0:1+0:2t, so that 80% of the people are
expected to fail. Using Bayesrule, those who fail will have a median type of 0:47, and mean
type of 0:48, and the population distribution will strictly rst order stochastically dominate
their beliefs. Thus a population facing a di¢ cult test will exhibit apparent undercondence.
Theorem 9 below formalizes the above argument using a testing model (dened in Section
1.1.3). Let p be the prior that nature uses in the testing model and P be the associated
cumulative distribution function. Then E () =
R
dP is the average number of people who
pass the test, and this number is naturally interpreted as the di¢ culty of the test. We say
that a test is easy if E () < 1
2
and di¢ cult if E () > 1
2
. Let m be the median type.
Theorem 9 Suppose that beliefs are generated by a non-degenerate symmetric testing model.
Following the test, on average a fraction E () will consider that their mean type is strictly
better than the population median and will have beliefs about themselves that strictly f.o.s.d the
population distribution; a fraction 1 E () will consider that their mean type is strictly worse
than the population median and will have beliefs about themselves that are strictly f.o.s.d by
the population distribution. Furthermore, the fraction E () will consider that their median
type is weakly better than the population median. If p is a density, or p (m) is small enough,
the fraction E () (1   E ()) will consider that their median type is strictly better (worse)
than the population median. Thus, if the test is easy the population will exhibit apparent
overcondence, while if it is di¢ cult, the population will exhibit apparent undercondence.
Thus, when a task is di¢ cult or success is rarewe can expect apparent undercondence,
and when a task is easy, we can expect apparent overcondence.
29The median is the solution to
R t
0
(0:25t+ 0:875) dt = 12 , while the mean is given by
R 1
0
(0:25t+ 0:875) tdt:
30The crucial di¤erence between our discussion here and the reasoning of Healy and Moore (2007), is that
here everybody knows precisely the di¢ culty of the test they are taking. See Section 6 for a discusiion of
Healy and Moore (2007).
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5 Does it Matter?
In Section 2.1, we saw that apparently overcondent entrepreneurs might enter an industry
at a greater rate than entrepreneurs with neutral beliefs about their abilities. The same,
of course, is true about (actually) overcondent entrepreneurs. This invites the question:
does it really matter if a population is apparently overcondent but not overcondent, or
is the distinction merely semantic minutia? In this section, we argue that the distinction is
important.
Recall that in the two player game analyzed in Section 2.1, under the random ranking
treatment the equilibrium expected number of rms is 1 while under the test treatment 
which leads to apparent overcondence the equilibrium expected number of rms is greater
than 1. Crucially, however, the expected prots of each rm is zero under both treatments
(as is easily veried). In contrast, let us posit that the rms are truly overcondent. For
instance, suppose each rm irrationally believes there is a 3
4
chance that it is the more skillful.
Then in equilibrium, each rm enters with probability one and earns  1. Thus, while the
presence of overcondence requires us to rethink the basic economic tenet that rms will
not enter an industry if there are negative prots to be made, the presence of apparent
overcondence does not.
Some authors use overcondence as a springboard for assuming that agents have an irra-
tional bias. For instance, in an inuential nance paper, Malmendier and Tate (2005) write
Our overcondence story builds upon a prominent stylized fact from the social psychology
literature, the better-than-averagee¤ect. When individuals assess their relative skill, they
tend to overstate their acumen relative to the average. Armed with this supposed evi-
dence of irrationality, Malmendier and Tate go on to assume that the CEOs in their model
overestimate the returns to their projects. However, if, as we have argued, the evidence is
only that people are apparently overcondent, then the evidence is consistent with agents
using all the information available to them in the best possible way, in which case it supplies
no justication for assuming that agents make biased estimates. In particular, apparently
overcondent CEOs who are not overcondent will, on average, have a correct estimate of
the returns to their projects.
Should authorities regulate the behaviour of drivers by imposing speed limits, mandating
seat belt use, etc..., rather than simply informing them of the risks? One argument in
favour of such regulation would be that drivers have too much condence in their abilities.
As Svenson writes, Why should we pay much attention to information directed towards
drivers in general if [we believe] we are safer and more skillful than they are?But if drivers
are only apparently overcondent, they may well pay attention. Note that in the driving
example from the introduction, the 3
5
of the population who rate themselves above average
still believe that with a probability of 4
9
they are no more skilled than average, so there is
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certainly no reason for them to ignore advice pitched at the general population.
6 Literature
There is a vast literature on overcondence, both testing for it and providing explanations.
We have already mentioned some of the evidentiary literature. On the explanatory side, most
of the literature accepts that there is something wrong when a majority of people believe
they are above average, and either explains the phenomenon as resulting from a psychological
error, or nds a rational way around the data.
The rst category of explanations include egocentrism (Kruger (1999)), incompetence
(Kruger and Dunning (1999)) and self-serving biases (Greenwald (1980)).
In the second category of explanations, Dunning (1993) nds that people may have
varying notions of what, say, constitutes a good driver. If people are interpreting the question
di¤erently, there is not even an apparent contradiction when most people report themselves
to be better than average. Van den Steen (2004) and Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005) push
this further and propose that as a result of these variances, people invest in skills in di¤erent
ways. Santos-Pinto and Sobel write Without the ability to add to skills... precisely p percent
of the population would claim to be better than 1   p percent of the others.However, we
have shown that there is no need for there to be this perfect calibration, even if everyone
agrees on the evaluative criteria of skill, provided only that people do not know their own
skills exactly.
In Healy and Moore (2007), people take a test that may be either di¢ cult or easy. Each
person is uncertain about his own ability, and about the di¢ culty of the test he is taking.
A person who takes the easy test and does well, is uncertain if this is because he is of high
ability or because the test is easy; hence he rationally assigns weight to both possibilities
and considers himself to be above average. Since most people who take the easy test do
well, those who take the easy test appear to be overcondent. By the same token, those
who take the di¢ cult test appear to be undercondent. More precisely, following the logic
of Healy and Moore, averaging over the entire population of test takers (both easy and
di¢ cult), one should nd no apparent overcondence or undercondence, but the analyst
makes a mistake by focussing on the groups separately. Again following their logic, if subjects
understand the di¢ culty of their tasks, then their respective populations, even viewed in
isolation, should not rate themselves above or below average. However, we have shown that
there may be apparent overcondence and undercondence even in subjects who understand
their environments perfectly. As noted in Section 2.2, Hoelzl and Rustichini nd apparent
overcondence when their subjects are given an easy test and undercondence when they
are given a di¢ cult test. In their experiment subjects are told which test they are taking
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(and it is obvious), so that Healy and Moores analysis does not apply. Similarly, Kruger
(1999) subjectsconsider easy tasks (e.g., riding a bicycle) and di¢ cult tasks (e.g., juggling)
that are clearly delineated. Nonetheless, there are doubtless areas where it is hard to judge
di¢ culty and, even though that additional assumption is not necessary to generate apparent
overcondence, it may yield greater overcondence. Furthermore, Healy and Moore provide
experimental evidence in favour of their thesis.
While the above literature tries to explain how anomalous data can arise, we show that
the data is, in fact, not anomalous at all. In this regard, Zábojnik (2004) is more in the
spirit of our paper, although his approach is very di¤erent. In his model, agents can choose
to forego consumption in order to learn about their abilities, which may be either high or
low. Given certain technical assumptions  in particular U (at), an individuals utility as
a function of his ability, is strictly convex, and EU (at) =U (at) is decreasing the optimal
learning rule of agents leads them to halt their learning in a biased fashion. As a result,
a disproportionate number end up ranking themselves as high in ability, despite the fact
that they are all rational Bayesians. Hence, like us, Zábojnik nds that the mere fact that
a disproportionate number of people rank themselves in the top x% does not indicate a
problem. However, as Zábojnik readily admits, he is not really concerned with explaining
much of the experimental evidence, where his experimentation story is not very compelling.
Furthermore, he requires technical assumptions which play no role in our work. For instance,
we show that apparent overcondence can rationally arise whether or not an agents utility
is convex.
7 Conclusion
Consider two populations. In population A, about 50% of the people declare themselves
to be better than the median. In population B, about 80% of the people make the same
declaration. On the face of it, population A has good self knowledge, while population B
is somewhat delusional. Nonetheless, we have shown that, unless agents have a very good
idea of their own skills, the declaration of population B is no more aberrational than the
declaration of population A. Put di¤erently, there is no more reason to try and justifyBs
data than As; both sets of data can naturally arise as the result of agents learning about
their own skills.31
31Preston and Harris (1965) nd that drivers who have recently had accidents still rate themselves much
closer to the expert driver than to the poor driver, in a comparable fashion to a control group that has
not had any accidents (the actual data is not reported). This nding tends to go against our reasoning.
However, the accident drivers were interviewed while still in the hospital, and many faced severe legal and
nancial consequences as a result of the accidents, so there is considerable reason to view their answers
with skepticism. We note that only 15 admitted responsibility, while police reports blamed 34. Given the
30
Is there a tendency for people to be overcondent? We do not know, and have no stake
in the answer one way or the other. Psychologists do have theories independent of the
better-than-averageevidence we have cited for believing in overcondence. However, it is
imperative to have a clear statement of the problem (which we hope to have provided), and
to conduct proper empirical tests (such as the ones suggested in Section 3). As it stands,
much of the supposed evidence for overcondence shows nothing of the sort, even if the
evidence is completely accepted on its own terms.
Recent evidence has shown that the supposed universality of overcondence has been
overstated. In particular, populations appear to be undercondent with respect to di¢ -
cult skills, and there is little apparent overcondence or undercondence when the skill is
objectively dened. Our theory predicts these di¤erences.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We present the proof for the case in which the type space and
the signal space are nite; the proof when either is innite is technically more involved, but
the essential reasoning is the same.
Let p describe the distribution of types in the population. Suppose that person i is of
type ^
i
and has received the signal si. Since the posterior of i is degenerate, there is a ei
such that
Pr
ei j si = 1, Pr

si j eiPreiPn
i=1 Pr
 
si j iPr  i = 1, 8 6= eis.t. p () > 0;Pr  si j i = 0:
Since only type ei receives the signal si, we have ^i = ei: Thus, if beliefs are generated by
a signalling model and these beliefs are degenerate, they are correct, and it cannot be that
more than half the population believes it is better than the median.
Proof of Theorem 1. Fix the population median data that is to be rationalized,
1 > x > 1=2 and x y < 1
2
  x
1+x
: We now dene the elements of a symmetric signalling
model that will , , and  rationalize the population data x. The signalling structure
consists of the signal space S = f0; 1g, the type space = 3x 1
2
; x; 1+x
2
	
, and the probability
distributions f (1) = . The types are distributed in the population according to the prior p,
which assigns probability 2y to x, and 1
2
  y to each of 3x 1
2
and 1+x
2
. The expected fraction
of people who observe 1 is x. A person that observes 1 has a posterior belief given by
p ( j 1) =
8><>:
1+x
2x
 
1
2
  y  = 1+x
2
2y  = x
3x 1
2x
 
1
2
  y  = 3x 1
2
:
circumstances, these 19 denials can hardly be deemed irrational.
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We now check that this posterior distribution (strictly) rst order stochastically dominates
the prior:
p

1 + x
2
j 1

=
1 + x
2x

1
2
  y

>
1
2
  y = p

1 + x
2

p (x j 1) = 2y = p (x)
p

3x  1
2
j 1

=
3x  1
2x

1
2
  y

<
1
2
  y = p

3x  1
2

Thus, the population ranking data x can be  rationalized.
To see that the population ranking data x can be  rationalized, notice that the posterior
mean of a person who observes 1 is strictly larger than the prior mean, x, which is also the
prior median.
To see that the population ranking data x can be  rationalized, notice that the posterior
median of a person that observes 1 is (1+x)
2
, since
p

1 + x
2
j 1

>
1
2
, 1 + x
2x

1
2
  y

>
1
2
, 1
2
  x
1 + x
> y
by construction. Furthermore, (1+x)
2
> x.
Proof of Theorem 2. Pick any 1 > x; q > 1=2. Let the signalling structure be given
by S = f0; 1g,  = 3x 1
2
; x; 1+x
2
	
, and f (1) = . On , dene a probability distribution
p that assigns probability 2q   1 to x, and 1   q to each of 3x 1
2
and 1+x
2
. Notice that the
fraction of the population whose type is at most x is q.
An observation of 1 occurs with probability x. A person that observes 1 has a posterior
belief given by
p ( j 1) =
8><>:
1+x
2x
(1  q)  = 1+x
2
2q   1  = x
3x 1
2x
(1  q)  = 3x 1
2
and an expected type that is strictly larger than x. Therefore, the expected fraction of people
who will have a mean type strictly greater than the fraction q of the population is x.
The case 0 < x; q < 1
2
is symmetrical, while the remaining cases are easy.
We prove necessity in Theorem 3 with a lemma that will be used elsewhere.
Lemma 1 A fraction y or greater of a population can rationally believe that there is at least
a probability p that their types are: strictly better than the worse type in the top x% of the
population only if py  x; weakly better than a type  such that P (  ) = x only if
py  x; weakly worse than a type  such that P (  ) = x only if py  x
Proof. For the rst claim, we say that given P; the distribution of types in the population,
a type z is in the top x% of the population if P (  z)  1   x; so the worse type in the
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top x% is  = min fz : P (  z)  1  xg ; which implies P ( > )  x: Let Sw  S be
the set of signals s such that P ( >  j s)  p; and let F denote the marginal distribution
over signals so that y = F (Sw). Then,
x  P ( > ) =
Z
P ( >  j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
P ( >  j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
pdF (s) = py:
For the second claim, Let Sw  S be the set of signals s such that P (   j s)  p;
and let F denote the marginal distribution over signals so that y = F (Sw). Then,
x = P (  ) =
Z
P (   j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
P (   j s) dF (s) 
Z
Sw
pdF (s) = py:
The third claim is analogous to the second, and omitted.
Proof of Theorem 3. Necessity. To prove necessity, simply apply claims 2 and 3 of
Lemma 1 with p = 1=2 and x = i=k for i = 1; 2; ::; k.
Su¢ ciency. Let  = [0; k] and the prior is uniform. We then get that ki = i; and the
k cile i is Di = [i  1; 1] =

ki 1; 
k
i

.
Case 1: xi < 2=k for all i: We will construct the posterior beliefs given signal sj for all
j; assuming rst that for all i; xi  2=k: Let the posterior distribution over types after a
signal sj be
D1 ::: Dj ::: Dk
1
k
  x1
2
::: 1
k
  xj
2
+ 1
2
::: 1
k
  x10
2
which adds up to 1 :X1
k
  xi
2

+
1
2
= 1 
P
xi
2
+
1
2
= 1  1
2
+
1
2
= 1:
Given these posterior distributions, we build a joint probability distribution for signals and
types that gives as a result the observed data (in a law-of-large numbers) large population.
Let Qj =
 
qj1; q
j
2; :::; q
j
k

denote the posterior probability distribution over types, after having
observed sj; where qji is the probability that Q
j assigns to the types in k cile i: Then, the
initial joint probability distribution for types and signals is given by
k cile!
signal# 1 2 ::: k Marginal
s1 q11x1 q
1
2x1 ::: q
1
kx1 x1
s2 q21x2 q
2
2x2 ::: q
2
kx2 x2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
sk qk1xk q
k
2xk ::: q
k
kxk xk
Marginal 1
k
1
k
::: 1
k
1
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That the probability of s1 with this joint distribution is x1 follows immediately from the
fact that Qj is a probability distribution, and that therefore
P
i q
j
i = 1: We now show that
indeed the probability of the ith k cile is indeed 1
k
: We have
X
j
qjixj =
X
j 6=i
qjixj + q
i
ixi =
X
j 6=i
qjixj +

1
k
  xi
2
+
1
2

xi
=
X
j 6=i

1
k
  xi
2

xj +

1
k
  xi
2
+
1
2

xi =
X
j

1
k
  xi
2

xj +
xi
2
=
1
k
  xi
2
+
xi
2
=
1
k
:
Su¢ ciency. Case 2: xi > 2=k for some i:
Step 1. For all xi  2=k; the posterior after si initially allocates 50% to the ith k cile.
For xj > 2=k; the posterior after sj initially allocates a probability 1=kxj to the jth k cile,
Dj:
Step 2. Take the largest j such that xj > 2=k (notice that by the necessity part of the
Theorem, j < k) and allocate the probability mass
1
2
  1
kxj
(1)
on Dj+1; :::; Dk. Before clarifying how, notice that if j  1 + k=2 the following argument
shows that there is enough spaceon the k ciles larger than j to allocate the left over mass
from j :
xj + xj+1 + :::+ xk  2k   2 (j   1)
k
, xj+1 + :::+ xk  2k   2 (j   1)
k
  xj ,
 xj+1
2
  :::  xk
2
 xj
2
  k   (j   1)
k
,
1
k
  xj+1
2
  :::+ 1
k
  xk
2
 k   j
k
+
xj
2
  k   (j   1)
k
=
1
2
xj   1
k
(2)
Then, the total mass to be allocated (from those who receive signal sj; who are a proportion
xj of the population), the quantity in (1), times the probability of signal sj happening, which
is xj; yields the right hand side of (2), which is less than the spaceavailable in the k ciles
greater than j: In each k cile i greater than j; we have only used 1
k
  xi
2
of the mass available
and that is the left hand side of (2). Similarly, if j  1 + k=2; the total spaceavailable in
k ciles 1 + k=2 and greater is also enough to allocate at least 50% of the mass of Pij xi;
since the sum is at most 100%; and k ciles 1 + k=2 through k accumulate more than 50%
of the total probability.
Allocate as much as possible (of 1
2
xj   1k ) in Dk; if Dk is enough go to the next step; if
Dk is not enough, allocate as much as possible in Dk 1; continue in this fashion until 12xj  1k
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has been exhausted (we know from equation (2) that it will be exhausted before getting to
j).
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 with the largest h < j such that xh > 2=k; starting to allocate its
left over probability in the largest k cile that has less than 1=k probability already allocated
to it (generically, that will be the last k cile usedby xj). Continue with the largest k < h
such that xk > 2=k; starting to allocate its left over probability in the largest k cile that
has less than 1=k probability already allocated to it; continue in this fashion until there are
no other xjs such that xj > 2=k.
Step 4. For each signal sj we have now allocated 50% of the posterior probability
distribution. In the case of xj  2=k; 50% of the posterior is allocated in k cile Dj; for
xj > 2=k; 50% of the probability has been allocated through Steps 2 and 3. Hence for each
signal sj we need to allocate 50% more. Of course, since the sum of the masses supplied
by each signal is the same as the masses received by the k ciles, there is exactly room for
the 50% that we need to allocate now. A more formal proof of that argument now follows.
Suppose that k ciles i+ 1; :::; k are full(in the sense that the probability allocated to
them from their own xis and the js such that xj > 2=k already accounts for 1=k) while
only part of k cile i has been used: Note that the space available in Di before Step 3 was
1
k
  xi
2
; and that in Step 3 we allocated
X
j:xj>2=k
xj
2
  jfj : xj > 2=kgj
k| {z }
excess in the js such that xj>2=k
 
 
k   i
k
 
kX
i+1
xm
2
!
| {z }
part absorbed by k ciles Di+1;:::;Dk
to Di: Therefore, the available space in Di after Step 3 is
Ri  1
k
  xi
2
 
X
j:xj>2=k
xj
2
+
jfj : xj > 2=kgj
k
+
k   i
k
 
kX
i+1
xm
2
:
Note that since
jff < i : xf  2=kgj+ jfj : xj > 2=kgj+ jfi; i+ 1; :::; kgj = k
the total space available in all k ciles after Step 3 is
jff < i : xf  2=kgj
k
 
X
f<i:xf2=k
xf
2
+
1
k
  xi
2
 
X
j:xj>2=k
xj
2
+
jfj : xj > 2=kgj
k
+
k   i
k
 
kX
i+1
xm
2
=
jff < i : xf  2=kgj
k
+
jfj : xj > 2=kgj
k
+
k   i
k
+
1
k
 
X
f<i:xf2=k
xf
2
  xi
2
 
X
j:xj>2=k
xj
2
 
kX
i+1
xm
2
= 1 
X
f<i:xf2=k
xf
2
  xi
2
 
X
j:xj>2=k
xj
2
 
kX
i+1
xm
2
= 1 
kX
1
xm
2
=
1
2
:
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We now construct the remainder of the probability distribution conditional on any signal sj.
destination!
source# Dm : xm  2=k Di Dh : xh > 2=k Di+1; :::; Dk Total
sj 1
k
  xm
2
Ri 0 0
1
2
Weighted Total 1
k
  xm
2
Ri 0 0
1
2
Step 5. Build the joint probability distribution of signals and deciles by multiplying the
conditional distributions given sj by xj:
Proof of Theorem 4. For any xi we will have a collection

yji
	
such that
P
j y
j
i = xi
and yji will be the proportion of people announcing xi that actually belong to percentile j:
For all i; dene i = 1=k   xi: If xi > 1=k; we dene yii = 1k ; if xi  1=k; dene yii = xi.
The number i is the amount of probability needed or in excess in k cile i:
Step 1. Consider x1:
 If x1 > 1=k; take
j = min
(
j : j > 0 and
X
ij:i>0
i  x1   1
k
)
:
The index j is the smallest k cile that accumulates enough left over probability to cover
all the people who claimed x1: The min is well dened because some large j belongs to the
set, because
Pk
1 j = 0 implies thatX
j2:j>0
j 
X
j2
j = x1   1
k
:
For all j 2 E = fj : j < j and j > 0g ; let yj1 = j; and let yj

1 = x1   1k  
P
E y
j
1: For all
j =2 E [ f1; jg ; let yj1 = 0: Go to step 2.
 If x1  1=k; let yj1 = 0 for all j > 1: Go to Step 2.
The Step 2 will be repeated for i = 2; :::; k: Start Step 2 with i = 2:
Step 2.
 If xi > 1=k let n be the last index whose excess probabilitiy (n  0) was used to cover
the needs of the needy j (j < 0) with the largest index still lower than i. That is, for
h = max fj < i : j < 0g which is the last needy index before i; either through step 1, or
some previous iteration of Step 2, we used probability from other k ciles in order to get thatXk
m=1
ymh = xh   1k : Let n be the largest index such that ymh > 0: n = max fm : ymh > 0g :
Just as we identied j (as the smallest index that accumulated enough probability to cover
the needs of x1) in Step 1, we now nd the smallest index larger than n that accumulates
enough probability to cover xi   1k (when one subtracts from n the probability used for
indexes h and below). Formally
j = min
8<:j  n : j > 0 and k   X
g:n6=g
yng +
X
n<gj:1i>0
g  xi   1
k
9=; :
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  If j > n (i.e. the left-overs in index n are not enough to cover the needs of xi), let
yni = n  
X
n6=g<i
yng ;
for all j 2 E = fj : n < j < j and j > 0g ; let yji = j; and let yj

i = xi   1k   yni  
P
E y
j
i :
For all j =2 E [ fi; jg ; let yji = 0:
  If j = n; let yni = xi   1k and for all j =2 fi; jg ; let yji = 0.
  Go to Step 2, and repeat it with i+ 1 in place of i, or stop if i = k:
 If xi  1=k, let yji = 0 for all j 6= i: Go to Step 2, and repeat it with i+ 1 in place of i, or
stop if i = k:
The process allocates all the probability in k ciles where xi < 1=k to k ciles where
xi  1=k: For each i we have:
Pk
j=1 y
j
i = xi; so that all the individuals who actually belong
to k cile j and declare i; are exactly xi;
P100
j=1 y
i
j =
1
k
; so that all the individuals in k cile i
declare that they are in some (potentially other) k cile. The resulting matrix is
declared!
actual# 1 2 ::: k Sum
1 y11 y
1
2 ::: y
1
k
1
k
...
...
...
...
...
k yk1 y
k
2 ::: y
k
k
1
k
Sum x1 x2 ::: xk 1
To build the signalling structure let S =

s1; s2; :::; sk
	
be the set of signals, let  = R+
be the set of types and in order to build the prior density, start with p () = 1=k for all
 2 [0; 1] ; also, let f (si) = 100y1i for all i and all  2 [0; 1] : Notice that k0 = 0 and k1 = 1
are the lower and upper bound of the rst k cile. Also, since
E
 
 j s1 = Z p   j s1 d = Z f (s1) p ()
P (s1)
d =
Z

f (s
1) p ()
x1
d
we have that E ( j s1) depends on the values of the s that receive signal s1: If x1  1=k;
those s are just the interval [0; 1] since x1 = y11: If x1 > 1=k; the value of E ( j s1) depends
on the values of the s that receive signal s1 that are outside [0; 1] : If we assume that all
such s are equal to 1, we have
E
 
 j s1 = P  1st k   cile j s1E   j s1&1st+ P  not 1st k   cile j s1E   j s1&not1st
=
1
k
x1
E
 
 j s1&1+ x1   1k
x1
E
 
 j s1&not1 = 1k
x1
1
2
+
x1   1k
x1
E
 
 j s1&not1
=
1
k
x1
1
2
+
x1   1k
x1
1 =
2kx1   1
2kx1
2 (0; 1) :
Since this conditional expected value is in the interior of (0; 1) ; we have some leeway in
choosing the types that will feedE ( j s1) ; so that we can choose the types close enough
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to 1 and their densities in such a manner that the conditional expected value is still in the
interior of (0; 1) : We need this, so that after observing s1; individuals will claim that the
mean of their beliefs is in the rst k cile.
The main di¢ culty now will be allocating the probability in such a manner that: types
in the ith k cile receive signal sj with probability yij (that is f (sj) = kyij for types  in the
ith k cile); E ( j si) 2  ki 1; ki .
Suppose we have already allocated probability on some interval [0; z] ; and that the prob-
ability allocated so far is (i  1) =k: Assume also as an inductive hypothesis that if all the
remaining probability, k+1 i
k
; were allocated to  = z; we would have E ( j sj) 2  kj 1; kj 
for j  i  1:
Consider now k cile i:
 Start with the easiest case, one in which Pi 11 xi 1 = (i  1) =k: This is the easiest case
because the total mass of people claiming to be in k ciles less than i  1 is the same as the
total mass in the prior, so we can re-start the process of dening the prior (as if i were the
lowest k cile). In this case then, we repeat the rst step, dening p () = 1=k and letting
f (s
j) = kyij for all j and all  2 (z; z + 1]. It is then easy to check that: since yjm = 0 for
all m  i  1 and all j > i  1; the expected value of  for k ciles below i  1 is una¤ected
by how we dene k ciles weakly above i; and hence, E ( j sm) 2  km 1; km for m  i  1;
E ( j si) 2  ki 1; ki  if all the remaining probability, (k   i) =k were allocated to  = z + 1:
 SupposePi 11 xi 1 > (i  1) =k; which means that k ciles i 1 and below are borrowing
probability mass from k ciles above: for some j  i   1; and some m > i   1; ymj > 0:
Therefore, the expected value of  conditional on sj for j  i  1 will depend on the values
of the s in k ciles m > i   1; such that ymj > 0: Since, by the induction hypothesis,
E ( j sj) 2  kj 1; kj  for j  i 1; there exists an " > 0 such that if we dene p () = 1k" and
f (s
j) = kyij for all j and all  2 (z; z + "] ; and assume that if all the remaining probability,
(k   i) =k; were allocated to  = z + "; we still keep E ( j sj) 2  kj 1; kj  for j  i  1 plus
we obtain:
  if xi  1=k; E ( j si) = z+z+"2 = z + "2 2 (z; z + ") =
 
ki 1; 
k
i

;
  if xi > 1=k;
E
 
 j si = P  ith k   cile j siE   j si&i+ P  not ith k   cile j siE   j si& not i
=
1
k
xi
E
 
 j si&i+ xi   1k
xi
E
 
 j si& not i = 1k
xi
2z + "
2
+
xi   1k
xi
E
 
 j si& not i
=
1
k
xi
2z + "
2
+
xi   1k
xi
(z + ") = z + "  "
2kxi
2 (z; z + ") =  ki 1; ki  :
Therefore, we have shown that we can move the induction hypothesis to k cile i:
 Suppose Pi 11 xi 1 < (i  1) =k; which means that k ciles i   1 and below are lending
probability mass to the k ciles above: for some j  i   1; and some m > i   1; yjm > 0:
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Therefore, the expected value of  conditional on sj for j > i  1 will depend on the values
of the s in k ciles m  i   1; such that ymj > 0: However, and this is important, the
expected value of  conditional on sj for j  i  1 will not depend on the values of the s in
k ciles m > i 1: This means that we can choose the types and the density in k ciles i and
above without a¤ecting the induction hypothesis, that E ( j sj) 2  kj 1; kj  for j  i   1:
In particular, we will have to choose a (potentially large) m to play the role of " before.
For su¢ ciently large m; dene p () = 1
km
and f (sj) = kyij for all j and all  2 (z; z +m] :
Note that if we assume that if all the remaining probability, (k   i) =k; were allocated to
 = z +m; we still keep E ( j sj) 2  kj 1; kj  for j  i  1 plus we obtain:
  if xi  1=k; E ( j si) = z+z+m2 = z + m2 2 (z; z +m) =
 
ki 1; 
k
i

;
  if xi > 1=k; for some y < z we have
E
 
 j si = P  j < i j siE   j si&j < i+ P  i j siE   j si&i+ P  j > i j siE   j si& j > i
= P
 
j < i j si y + 1k
xi
2z +m
2
+ P
 
j > i j si (z +m) < z +m
and also, for m > 2kxi (z   P (j < i j si) y)  2z; we obtain
E
 
 j si = P  j < i j si y+ 1
kxi
2z +m
2
+P
 
j > i j si (z +m)  P  j < i j si y+ 1
kxi
2z +m
2
> z:
This means that for largem; the induction hypothesis is kept and we can repeat the previous
steps with k cile i+ 1:
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 used symmetric testing models,
in which a signal of 1 is pass the test, so there is nothing left to prove.
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 2 follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Suppose data (x1; x2; x3; 1  x2   x3) can be rationalized by distributions f =
p =
 
p1; p

2; p

3; p

4

for  = 1; 2; 3; 4: Then, if higher types observe higher signals, in a sense
weaker than fosd, namely p14  p24  p34; then we get
p33 + p
4
3  p13 + p23  2  8x1   8x2 + 3
 
p31 + p
4
1 + p
3
2 + p
4
2
  2  8x1   8x2:
This implies that if x1 and x2 are small, the data is very close to (0; 0; 1; 0)
Proof. Since the signalling structure rationalizes the data, the expected number of
people who observe signal j must be xj; and hence we must have,
4X
i
pi1 = 4x1;
4X
i
pi2 = 4x2 and
4X
i
pi3 = 4x3
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In order for those who observe signal s3 to declare that their median is in quartile 3 (and
similarly for s4) it must be the case that
1  p41   p42   p43
4 P pi1  P pi2  P pi3  12 ,
X
pi1 +
X
pi2 +
X
pi3  2 + 2p41 + 2p42 + 2p43
p33 + p
4
3P
pi3
 1
2
, 2p33 + 2p43 
X
pi3
Putting together the two lines, we get
2p33+2p
4
3 
X
pi3  2+2p41+2p42+2p43 
X
pi1 
X
pi2 ) p33 
2 + p41 + p
4
2  
P
i<4 p
i
1  
P
i<4 p
i
2
2
:
Then,
p34 = 1 p31 p32 p33  1 p31 p32 
2 + p41 + p
4
2  
P
i<4 p
i
1  
P
i<4 p
i
2
2
=
p11 + p
2
1   p31   p41 + p12 + p22   p32   p42
2
So if higher types observe higher signals in the sense that p14  p24  p34, we get
p14  p24  p34 
p11 + p
2
1   p31   p41 + p12 + p22   p32   p42
2
: (3)
Then by this last equation, and since for j = 1; 2 we have
P
i p
i
j = 4xj, we obtain that
p13 + p
2
3 = 2 
 
p11 + p
2
1
   p12 + p22   p14 + p24  2   p11 + p21   p12 + p22   p11 + p21   p31   p41 + p12 + p22   p32   p42
= 2  2  p11 + p21  2  p12 + p22+ p31 + p41 + p32 + p42 = 2  2  4x1   p31   p41  2  4x2   p32   p42+ p31 + p41 + p32 + p42
= 2  8x1   8x2 + 3
 
p31 + p
4
1 + p
3
2 + p
4
2

:
Given this, and the requirement that enough of the mass that goes to quartile 3 must come
from quartiles 3 and 4, which is
2p33 + 2p
4
3 
X
pi3 , p33 + p43  p13 + p23;
we obtain
p33 + p
4
3  p13 + p23  2  8x1   8x2 + 3
 
p31 + p
4
1 + p
3
2 + p
4
2
  2  8x1   8x2:
Proof of Theorem 6. Since the case of k = 2 is already covered with the teting models,
we will concentrate on the case in which k > 2: Moreover, we will use a signalling structure
that has the monotone likelihood ratio property: for 0 in k cile j and  is in k cile i; for
j > i; f0 (s) =f (s) is increasing in s (if the signalling structure has this property, it is also
f-reasonable). Dene d  k   2Pk1 ixi, x a small "; and dene
g"k (s) = xs

1  "k   2s
k   2

+
"d
k (k   2) and g
"
1 (s) = xs

1 + "
k   2s
k   2

  "d
k (k   2) :
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The distribution g"k is (for small ") a probability distribution, since for all s; g
"
k (s) 2 (0; 1)
and
kX
i=1
g"k (i) =
kX
i=1

xi

1  "k   2i
k   2

+
"d
k (k   2)

=
kX
i=1
xi

1  "k   2i
k   2

+
"d
k   2
= 1  "
k   2
kX
i=1
xi (k   2i) + "d
k   2 = 1 
"
k   2
 
k   2
kX
i=1
ixi
!
+
"d
k   2 = 1:
A similar calculation applies to g"1: For types  in k cile i; the distribution over S will be
(for any small " such that g"k and g
"
1 are probability distributions)
f (s) =
i  1
k   1g
"
k (s) +

1  i  1
k   1

g"1 (s) = xs +

1  2 i  1
k   1

"

xs
k   2s
k   2  
d
k (k   2)

:
If 0 is in k cile j and  is in k cile i; for j > i;
f0 (s)
f (s)
=
j 1
k 1g
"
k (s) +
 
1  j 1
k 1

g"1 (s)
i 1
k 1g
"
k (s) +
 
1  i 1
k 1

g"1 (s)
=
xs +
 
1  2 j 1
k 1

"

xs
k 2s
k 2   dk(k 2)

xs +
 
1  2 i 1
k 1

"

xs
k 2s
k 2   dk(k 2)

that is increasing in s; so the signaling structure has the monotone likelihood ratio property.
In addition, with this signalling structure, and setting P (k   cile j) = 1=k; the probability
of signal s = i is
P (i) =
kX
j=1
P (i j  2 k   cile j)P (k   cile j) =
kX
j=1
j 1
k 1g
"
k (i) +
 
1  j 1
k 1

g"1 (i)
k
=
kX
j=1
xi +
 
1  2 j 1
k 1

"

xs
k 2i
k 2   dk(k 2)

k
=
kxi + "

xs
k 2i
k 2   dk(k 2)
Pk
j=1
 
1  2 j 1
k 1

k
= xi:
Letting A be the k  k matrix where row i is
[P ( 2 k   cile 1 j s = i) ; P ( 2 k   cile 2 j s = i) ; :::; P ( 2 k   cile k j s = i)]
the Perron-Frobenius theorem tells us that there exists a vector  such that A =  (it tells us
that there exists a largest eigenvalue r, which in this case, A being a right stochastic matrix,
is 1; so that A = r). This means that if we set  to be the elements of ;  = f1; :::; kg ;
we have that the expected value of your type, conditional on signal s = i is i:Moreover, since
the posterior P ( j s = i) is increasing in i (that is, higher signals increase the posterior) we
have that i < j for i < j (since i is the expected value of  conditional on signal i; and
similarly for j).
In order to make the median of the population distribution unique, we: make the type
space [1   1; k + 1] ; for each i pick a i+ 1
2
2 (i; i+1) ; and a density hi on

i  1
2
; i+ 1
2

such that the expected value is i. Then, we make the population distribution
P
hi=k:
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Proof of Theorem 7. We start by showing that i p is the distribution of types in the
population, E (t) = E (p) : Let ps denote the posterior of p given signal s, which is drawn
from the distribution ft for a type t: The following beliefs are a martingaleargumentX
s
Pr (s) ps (t) =
X
s
(X

p () f (s)
)
ft (s) p (t)P
 f (s) p ()
=
X
s
ft (s) p (t) = p (t)
and t (s) =
P
t tps (t) imply that
E (t) =
X
s
Pr (s) t (s) =
X
s
Pr (s)
 X
t
tps (t)
!
, E (t (s)) =
X
t
t
X
s
Pr (s) ps (t) =
X
t
tp (t) = E (p) :
as was to be shown.
Then, since E (t (s)) = E (p) = m, we get E
 
1
n
Pn
i=1
ti

= E (p) = m; as was to be
shown.
The proof of Theorem 9 is a simple corollary of the following Lemma, versions of which
are well known (see Wolfstetter (1999) Chapter 4) we will use the strict inequalities in this
version of our Lemma, and in addition we do not require that P has a density.
Lemma 3 The posterior after passing a test fosd the prior, which fosd the posterior after
failing the test. Moreover, letting n denote a fail, y a pass, and letting P be the population
distribution, for any x such that 1 > P (  x) > 0,
P (  x j n) > P (  x) and P (  x) > P (  x j y)
Proof of Lemma 3. We only compare the prior to the posterior after n; since the
comparison between the prior and the posterior after y is symmetric. Because of BayesRule
we must show that
P (  x j n) =
R x
0
(1  z) dPR 1
0
(1  z) dP 
R x
0
dP = P (  x), R x
0
"
1  zR 1
0
(1  z) dP   1
#
dP  0
, R x
0

1  z
1  E ()   1

dP  0, R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP  0 (4)
and that the inequality is strict whenever P (  x) > 0. The integrand in the last inequality
is strictly decreasing in z, and is 0 for z = E () : First notice that for any x  E () ; the
inequality is satised (because it is the integral of a positive function). If for some x > E ()
we had R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP < 0; (5)
for any x0 > x we would also haveR x0
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP 
R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP < 0;
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since E() z
1 E() < 0 for x  z  x0 (because E() z1 E() is decreasing, and E() x1 E() < 0 must hold if
equation 5 holds). This contradicts that for x0 = 1 we must have
R x0
0
E() z
1 E()dP = 0:
Now lets turn to the strict inequalities. Pick any x  E () ; with 1 > P (  x) > 0: If
x = E () ; we know that P ( < x) > 0 (because P is non degenerate, and it cant assign
positive probability only to   E ()), and since the integrand in the last inequality of
equation (4) is strictly positive for all z < E (), we must have that the integral is strictly
positive, as was to be shown. If x < E () ; the strictly positive integrand and P (  x) > 0
ensure that the integral is also strictly positive.
Pick any x > E () ; and assume that
R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP  0:
Since 1 > P (  x) holds, we must have P ( > x) > 0: But then, E() z
1 E() < 0 for all
z  x > E () and P ( > x) > 0 imply that
0 =
R 1
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP =
R x
0
E ()  z
1  E ()dP + infw>x
R 1
w
E ()  z
1  E ()dP
 0 + inf
w>x
R 1
w
E ()  z
1  E ()dP < 0
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 8. Necessity is proved by the rst claim in Lemma 1. For
su¢ ciency take any p; y and x such that py  x: Assume that y  x (the opposite case
is treated similarly). Let the type space be  = [0; 1] ; let the population be distributed
uniformly on [0; 1] ; and let S = f0; 1g : The signalling structure is such that f (1) = y x1 x for
  1  x; and f (1) = 1 for  > x. Then,
P (  x j s = 1) = P (1 j   x)P (  x)
P (1 j   x)P (  x) + P (1 j  < x)P ( < x) =
x
x+ (1  x) y x
1 x
=
x
y
 p:
Proof of Proposition 4. Let p be the population distribution, m be the median of p.
Let  < 1
2
be such that if a distribution q over is -close to degenerate for any   ; and the
mean of q is strictly larger than m; then the type i such that d (q; ei) = maxj
qj   eij  
satises i > m: Similarly, let 
 < 1
2
be such that if a distribution q over  is -close to
degenerate for any   ; and the mean of q is weakly lower than m; then the type i such
that d (q; ei) = maxj
qj   eij   satises i  m: Set t and  < min; 	 such that
 < (1  ) ( + "+ t  1) and 1   < (1  ) (t   + ")
Assume that xm  +" for some S and ffg that have the property that P fs : posterior after s is    close to degenerateg >
t: For this signalling model, and letting B (p j s) denote the posterior of p given s; dene
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S = fs : B (p j s) is -close to degenerateg ; Sm = fs 2 S : B (p j s) has median > mg
and S = fs 2 S : B (p j s) has mean > mg : Then, since  <  < 1=2, if the median of
B (p j s) is > m; the type i on which B (p j s) is close to degenerate (for s 2 S) is larger
than m, so that P ( > m j s)  1  , and therefore
 = P f > mg =
X
s
P ( > m j s)P (s) 
X
Sm
P ( > m j s)P (s)

X
Sm
(1  )P (s) = (1  )
X
Sm
P (s)  (1  ) (xm   1 + t)
 (1  ) ( + "  1 + t) ;
which is a contradiction. Similarly (with S playing the role of Sm; and using the denition
of  in the second inequality) we obtain that x <  + ":
Assume now that xm     "; and let Sm = fs 2 S : B (p j s) has median  mg and
S = fs 2 S : B (p j s) has mean  mg : Then,
1   = P f  mg =
X
s
P (  m j s)P (s) 
X
Sm
P (  m j s)P (s)

X
Sm
(1  )P (s) = (1  )
X
Sm
P (s)  (1  ) (1  xm   1 + t)
 (1  ) (t  xm)  (1  ) (t   + ") ;
which is a contradiction. Again, the argument for x is similar and omitted, so the proof is
complete.
Proof of Theorem 9. We will develop the arguments for the posterior after y; since
those for n are analogous. The probability of observing y in the test is E () ; and then,
by Lemma 3, the posterior P ( j y) strictly fosd the population distribution, which also
implies that the posterior mean is strictly larger than the prior mean (which is the median
by symmetry). Also by Lemma 3 the fraction E () (who observed y) will consider that their
median type is weakly larger than the population median.
Suppose rst that the population distribution has a density. Then,
P (  m j y) =
R m
0
dP
E ()
<
m
R m
0
dP
E ()
=
mP (  m)
E ()
= P (  m) = 1
2
so thatm is no longer the median of the posterior. If the distribution does not have a density,
and the median is not unique, still P (  m) = 1=2 for all but the highest median, so the
argument above establishes that none of those remains a median after a y:
If the distribution does not have a density and the median is unique, assume that p (m)
is small enough that
p (m)m+ p ( < m)E ( j  < m) < m=2
(notice that if p (m) = 0 the inequality is satised). Then, as before (and using the assump-
tion for the strict inequality),
P (  m) =
Z m
0
dP  1
2
>
p (m)m+ p ( < m)E ( j  < m)
m
=
R m
0
dP
E ()
= P (  m j y)
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which establishes that m is not a median of the posterior after y:
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